Limitations of ‘Natural Function’ Concepts for the Ethics of Environmental Ethics – Prof James “Jack” Justus

Abstract

Many approaches to environmental aesthetics appeal to biological science. The appeals are intended to achieve a variety of ends: pinpoint which aesthetic considerations are appropriate for natural entities, establish that those considerations are ethically significant, and show that the resulting ethical valuations yield defensible judgments. I cast doubt on appeals utilizing ‘natural function’ concepts. The main goal of such appeals is to underwrite a kind of objectivity in the aesthetic evaluation of natural objects and systems, one reflecting the indispensable contribution ecology and evolutionary biology make to understanding them. But that objective outstrips what those sciences can deliver. In some cases, the conceptual work required––e.g. distinguishing different types of natural functions or individuating the bearers of these functions––is simply not supplied by the science. In other cases, scientific findings seem to challenge the aesthetic judgments natural functions are claimed to support, particularly the aesthetic value of some evolutionary outcomes. Perhaps most importantly, the ‘natural function’ concept does not seem to further the aim of securing a suitably objective, non-anthropocentric basis for environmental ethics.

Speaker

James “Jack” Justus is professor of philosophy at Florida State University. Besides philosophy of science (esp. biology) and history of analytic philosophy (esp. Carnap and logical empiricism generally), his research interests include environmental philosophy, formal epistemology, metaphilosophy, and philosophy of mathematics. Thus far he has published in numerous philosophical and scientific journals, and been unjustly rejected from even more. He recently authored Philosophy of Ecology: An Introduction with Cambridge University Press.